A couple of cases of interest on the unpublished list today:
Dayspring Development, LLC v. Little Canada: A case on its third trip to the Court; this time, the Court holds that the LLC lacks standing to seek compensation for a regulatory taking that occurred between 2003 and 2005. At the time of the taking, the principal officer of the LLC owned the property individually, only quitclaiming the property to the LLC after the City relented and granted a final plat and development agreement. The Court determines that the interest in takings compensation is separate from the general ownership interest, and the transfer of property to the LLC failed to convey the right to takings compensation. This is not the usual outcome for a regulatory takings case, but the Court felt that because the takings period was finite (ending with the plat approval), the right to compensation should be treated as a standard eminent-domain claim, accruing to the owner at the time of the taking, unless the interest is specifically conveyed. The logic is simple enough, but don’t be surprised if the Supreme Court picks it up to chew over the need for a separate transfer of the right to compensation.
Otsego v. New River Hospital District: What drives a judge to quote classic-rock standards in an opinion? Read Judge Johnson’s concurrence in this case and decide for yourself. I can’t decide whether it’s a stellar display of legal principle applying over personal opinion, or just a judge throwing a tantrum after being talked out of legislating from the bench. The opinion certainly makes clear that launching an appeal when your only argument is “arbitrary and capricious” is normally a fool’s errand. Where Judge Johnson loses me is that it’s not because of a weak legal standard or drafting problem in the Legislature; it’s the proper separation of powers in government that keeps the courts from playing Monday-morning quarterback with executive and legislative decisions. In short, it’s a feature, not a bug. This opinion should immediately go into the curriculum of high-school civics classes throughout the state.
Harmsen v. Minneapolis: Notable for the return of a normal application of the Ridgewood estoppel analysis. “Normal,” in the sense that affirmative misconduct – malfeasance – is required to prevent the enforcement of otherwise valid law. Last month, in North Oaks v. Sarpal, a different three-judge panel seemed to throw that requirement overboard when it held that “erroneous government advice” was enough to satisfy the test (or at least was enough to back up a trial court judge who thought so). It’s not at all clear how “erroneous advice” differs from any other mistake a planning department employee might make, but that’s now the central holding of a published Court of Appeals opinion. The facts in Harmsen don’t set up a great conflict between the opinions, but it shows that the Sarpal decision needs to be harmonized, somehow, with the Ridgewood-KMart line of cases on wrongful conduct. If “malfeasance” is not the standard, then the standard effectively becomes “Does the judge blame the city or the owner for the problem?” – especially if the decision is only reviewed for abuse of discretion.